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Abstract
The fault tolerance theories of Arora and Kulkarni [3] and of Jhumka et
al. [11] view a fault-tolerant program as the result of composing a fault-intolerant
program with fault tolerance components called detectors and correctors. At
their core, the theories assume that the correctness specifications under consid-
eration are fusion closed. In general, fusion closure of specifications can be
achieved by adding history variables to the program. However, addition of his-
tory variables causes an exponential growth of the state space of the program,
causing addition of fault tolerance to be expensive. To redress this problem, we
present a method which can be used to add history information to a program in a
way that (in a certain sense) minimizes the additional states. Hence, automated
methods that add fault tolerance can now be efficiently applied in environments
where specifications are not necessarily fusion closed.
Keywords:
fault-tolerance, safety, fusion closure, specifications, transition systems, theory, exten-
sion
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1 Introduction
It is an established engineering method in computer science to generate complicated
things from simpler things. The most obvious example for this is a compiler for a pro-
gramming language (like C). The compiler takes a high-level programming instruction
in form of a C program and generates a sequence of machine code instructions that per-
form the specified task. Of course, the original C program might be complicated too,
but it is at least easier to understand than the generated assembly code since it abstracts
away from the machine architecture and supports a more natural formulation of control
structures etc.
Another area in which this technique has been applied is the area of fault-tolerant
systems. The goal is to start off with a system which is not fault-tolerant for certain
kinds of faults and use a sound procedure to transform it into a program which is
fault-tolerant. The approaches which have been proposed range from practical propos-
als like Schneider’s state machine approach [17] to theoretical studies like the one by
Basu et al. [5]. The former approach can be used to tolerate permanent faults in a cer-
tain number of replicated processes while the latter approach studies tolerance against
certain types of transient communication faults. Although these methods can be com-
bined, in general they seem a little oversized since they cannot be easily adapted to
other types of faults with finer granularity like a stuck-at-0 register.
To this end, Arora and Kulkarni [3] initially presented a method which can be used
to combat finer grained fault assumptions. Fault tolerance is achieved by composing a
fault-intolerant program with two types of fault-tolerance components called detectors
and correctors. Briefly spoken, a detector is used to detect a certain (error) condi-
tion on the system state and a corrector is used to bring the system into a valid state
again. Since common fault-tolerance methods like triple modular redundancy or er-
ror correcting codes can be modeled by using detectors and correctors, the theory can
be viewed as an abstraction of many existing fault tolerance techniques, including the
state machine approach.
Kulkarni and Arora [12] and more recently Jhumka et al. [11] proposed meth-
ods to automate the addition of detectors and correctors to a fault-intolerant program.
The basic idea of these methods is to perform a state space analysis of the fault-
affected program and change its transition relation in such a way that it still satisfies
its specification in the presence of faults. These changes result in either the removal
of transitions to satisfy a safety specification or the addition of transitions to satisfy
a liveness specification. Ga¨rtner and Vo¨lzer [9] analyzed the assumptions behind the
original Kulkarni-Arora method and argued that it is based on two distinct forms of
redundancy: redundancy in space and redundancy in time. The former refers to non-
reachable states of the program while the latter refers to non-reachable transitions.
However, the detector/corrector method cannot be viewed as a method which “adds
redundancy” (like for example the state machine approach) because the redundancy is
already present in the fault intolerant program. This stems from the fact that Arora and
Kulkarni [3] assume that their correctness specifications are fusion closed.
Basically, fusion closure means that the next step of a program merely depends
on the current state and not on the previous history of the execution. For example,
given a program with a single variable x ∈ N, then the specification “never x = 1”
is fusion closed while the specification “x = 4 implies that previously x = 2” is
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not. Specifications written in the popular Unity Logic [6] are fusion closed [10], as
are specifications consisting of state transition systems (like C programs). But general
temporal logic formulas which are usually used in the area of fault-tolerant program
synthesis and refinement [15, 16] are not. Arora and Kulkarni [3, p. 75] originally
argued that this assumption is not restrictive in the sense that for every non-fusion
closed specification there exists an “equivalent” specification which is fusion closed if
it is allowed to add history variables to the program. History variables are additional
control variables which are used to record the previous state sequence of an execution
and hence can be used to answer the question of, e.g., “has the program been in state
x = 2?”. Using such a history variable h the example above which was not fusion
closed can be rephrased in a fusion-closed fashion as:
“never (x = 4 and (x = 2) 6∈ h)”
However, these history variables add states to the program and in effect add the neces-
sary redundancy to be fault-tolerant.
There are obvious “brute force” approaches on how to add history information like
the one sketched above where the history variable remembers the entire previous state
sequence of an execution. However, since history variables must be implemented,
they exponentially enlarge the state space of the fault-intolerant program. Rephrasing
this in the redundancy terminology of Ga¨rtner and Vo¨lzer [9], history variables add
redundancy in space. Specifically, the history variables add exponential redundancy
in space, which is costly. So, we are interested in adding as little redundancy (i.e.,
as little additional states) as possible. Intuitively, the minimal amount of redundancy
which is necessary to tolerate a certain class of faults depends on the kind and nature
of the faults.
In this paper, we present a method to add history states to a program in a way
which (in general) avoids exponential growth of the state space. More specifically,
we start with a problem specification SPEC1 which is not fusion closed, a program
Σ1 which satisfies SPEC1 and a class of faults F . Depending on F we show how to
transform SPEC1 and Σ1 into SPEC2 and Σ2 in such a way that (a) SPEC2 is fusion
closed, (b) Σ2 can be made fault tolerant for SPEC2 iff Σ1 can be made fault tolerant
for SPEC1, and (c) Σ2 is (in a certain sense) minimal with respect to the added states.
We restrict our attention to cases where SPEC is a safety property and therefore are
only concerned with what Arora and Kulkarni call fail-safe fault-tolerance [3].
The benefit of the proposed method is the following: Firstly, it makes the methods
which automatically add detectors [11, 12] amendable to specifications which are not
fusion closed and closes a gap in the applicability of the detector/corrector theory [3].
And secondly, the presented method offers further insight into the efficiency of the
basic mechanisms which are applied in fault tolerance.
The paper is structured as follows: We first present some preliminary definitions
in Section 2 and then relate the assumption of fusion closure to the notion of state
space redundancy in Section 3. In Section 4 we study specifications which are not fu-
sion closed and present a method which makes these types of specifications efficiently
manageable in the context of automated methods which add fault tolerance. Finally,
Section 5 presents some open problems and directions for future work.
3
2 Formal Preliminaries
In this section we define the formal system model used throughout this paper.
2.1 States, Traces and Properties
The state space of a program is an unstructured finite nonempty set C of states. A
state predicate over C is a boolean predicate over C. A state transition over C is a
pair (r, s) of states from C.
In the following, let C be a state set and T be a state transition set. We define a
trace over C to be a non-empty sequence s1, s2, s3, . . . of states over C. We sometimes
use the notation si to refer to the i-th element of a trace. Note that traces can be finite
or infinite. A trace is finite if its length is finite. We will always use greek letters to
denote traces and normal lowercase letters to denote states. For two traces α and β,
we write α · β to mean the concatenation of the two traces. We say that a transition t
occurs in some trace σ if there exists an i such that (si, si+1) = t.
We define a property over C to be a set of traces over C. A trace σ satisfies a
property P iff σ ∈ P . If σ does not satisfy P we say that σ violates P . There are two
important types of properties called safety and liveness [2, 13]. Informally spoken, a
safety property demands that “something bad never happens” [13], i.e., it rules out a set
of unwanted trace prefixes. Mutual exclusion and deadlock freedom are two promi-
nent examples of safety properties. A liveness property on the other hand demands
that “something good will eventually happen” [13] and can be used to formalize, e.g.,
notions of termination. Since we are only concerned with safety properties we omit a
formal definition of liveness. Safety properties are formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 (safety property over C) A safety property S over C is a property over
C for which the following holds: For each trace σ which violates S there exists a prefix
α of σ such that for all traces β, α · β violates S.
2.2 Programs, Specifications and Correctness
We define programs as state transition systems consisting of a state set C, a set of
initial states I ⊆ C and a transition relation T over C, i.e., a program (sometimes also
called system) is a triple Σ = (C, I, T ). The state predicate I together with the state
transition set T describe a safety property S, i.e., all traces which are constructable by
starting in a state in I and using only state transitions from T . We denote this property
by safety-prop(Σ). For brevity, we sometimes write Σ instead of safety-prop(Σ). A
state s ∈ C of a program Σ is reachable iff there exists a trace σ ∈ Σ such that s
occurs in σ. Otherwise s is non-reachable. Sometimes we will call a non-reachable
state a redundant.
We define specifications to be properties, i.e., a specification over C is a prop-
erty over C. A safety specification is a specification which is a safety property. Un-
like Arora and Kulkarni [3], we do not assume that problem specifications are fusion
closed. Fusion closure is defined as follows: Let C be a state set, s ∈ C, X be property
over C, α, γ finite state sequences, and β, δ, σ be state sequences over C.
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Definition 2 (fusion closed set) The set X is fusion closed if the following holds: If
α · s · β and γ · s · δ are in X then α · s · δ and γ · s · β are also in X .
It is easy to see that for every program Σ holds that safety-prop(Σ) is fusion closed.
Intuitively, fusion closure means that the entire history of every trace is present in
every state of the trace. We will give examples for fusion closed and not fusion closed
specifications later.
Let SPEC be a specification and Σ be a program over C. We say that Σ satisfies
SPEC iff all traces in Σ satisfy SPEC . Consequently, we say that Σ violates SPEC iff
there exists a trace σ ∈ Σ which violates SPEC .
2.3 Extensions
Given some program Σ1 = (C1, I1, T1) our goal is to define the notion of a fault-
tolerant version Σ2 of Σ1 meaning that Σ2 does exactly what Σ1 does in fault-free
scenarios and has additional fault-tolerance abilities which Σ1 lacks. Sometimes, Σ2 =
(C2, I2, T2) will have additional states (i.e., C2 ⊃ C1) and for this case we must define
what these states “mean” with respect to the original program Σ1. This is done using
a state projection function pi : C2 7→ C1 which tells which states of Σ2 are “the same”
with respect to states of Σ1. A state projection function can be naturally extended to
traces and properties, e.g., for a trace s1, s2, . . . over C2 holds that pi(s1, s2, . . .) =
pi(s1), pi(s2), . . .
Definition 3 (extends) Let Σ1 = (C1, I1, T1) and Σ2 = (C2, I2, T2) be two pro-
grams. Program Σ2 extends program Σ1 using state projection pi iff the following
conditions hold:
1. C2 ⊇ C1,
2. pi is a total mapping from C2 to C1 (for simplicity we assume that for any s ∈ C1
holds that pi(s) = s), and
3. pi(safety-prop(Σ2)) = safety-prop(Σ1).
Note that the concept of extension is related to the notion of refinement [1]. Ex-
tensions are refinements with the additional property that the original state space is
preserved and that there is no notion of stuttering [1].
If Σ2 extends Σ1 using pi and Σ1 satisfies SPEC then obviously pi(Σ2) satisfies
SPEC . When it is clear from the context that Σ2 extends Σ1 we will simply say that
Σ2 satisfies SPEC instead of “pi(Σ2) satisfies SPEC”.
2.4 Fault Models and Fault-Tolerant Versions
Since we are concerned with fault tolerant systems we must have a way of modeling
faulty behavior. We define a fault model F as being a program transformation [8],
i.e., a mapping F from programs to programs. The resulting program is called the
fault-affected version. For a given program Σ, F (Σ) is also called program Σ in the
presence of faults F.
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We require that a fault model does not tamper with the set of initial states, i.e.,
we rule out “immediate” faults that occur before the system is switched on. We also
restrict ourselves to the case where F “adds” transitions, since this is the only way to
violate a safety specification.
Definition 4 (fault model) A fault model F maps a program Σ = (C, I, T ) to a pro-
gram F (Σ) = (F (C), F (I), F (T )) such that the following conditions hold:
1. F (C) = C
2. F (I) = I
3. F (T ) ⊃ T
For a given fault model F and a specification SPEC , we say that a program Σ is
F -intolerant with respect to SPEC if Σ satisfies SPEC but F (Σ) violates SPEC .
Given two programs Σ1 and Σ2 such that Σ2 extends Σ1 and a fault model F , it
makes sense to assume that F treats Σ1 and Σ2 in a “similar way”. Basically, this
means that F should at least add the same transitions to Σ1 and Σ2. But with respect
to the possible new states of Σ2 it can possibly add new fault transitions. This models
faults which occur within the fault-detection and correction mechanisms.
Definition 5 (fault extension monotonicity) A fault model F is extension monotonic
iff for any two programs Σ1 = (C1, I1, T1) and Σ2 = (C2, I2, T2) such that Σ2 extends
Σ1 using pi holds:
F (T1) \ T1 ⊆ F (T2) \ T2
original system Σ1
extension Σ2 a b
a b a b
d c
a b
d
pi
not extension monotonicextension monotonic
Figure 1: Examples for extension monotonic and not extension monotonic fault mod-
els.
An example is given in Fig. 1. The original system is given at the top and the
extension is given below (the state projection is implied by vertical orientation, i.e.,
states which are vertically aligned are mapped to the same state by pi). In the left
example the fault model is extension monotonic since all fault transitions in Σ1 are
also in Σ2. The right example is not extension monotonic. Intuitively, an extension
monotonic fault model maintains at least its original transitions over extensions.
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The extension monotonicity requirement does not restrict faulty behavior on the
new states of the extension. However, we have to restrict this type of behavior since
it would be impossible to build fault-tolerant versions otherwise. In this paper we
assume a very general type of restriction: it basically states that in any infinite sequence
of extensions of the original program there is always some point where F does not
introduce new fault transitions anymore.
Definition 6 (finite fault model) A extension monotonic fault model F is finite iff for
any infinite sequence of programs Σ1,Σ2, . . . such that for all i, Σi+1 extends Σi holds
that there exists a j such that for all k ≥ j no new fault transition is introduced in Σk,
i.e., F (Tk+1) \ Tk+1 = F (Tk) \ Tk.
Finite fault models retain the fault transitions in the original program (i.e., they are
extension monotonic for each pair of extensions). They do not restrict the additional
faulty behavior introduced in the new states of an extension. However, they exclude
fault models for which infinite redundancy is necessary to tolerate them. The engineer-
ing process is as follows: Given a program Σ1 and a fault model F , we extend Σ1 to
Σ2 to make F tolerable. Then we look at the new states introduced in this process and
consider faults which might happen there. Regarding these new faults we construct a
new extension Σ3 of Σ2 to potentially tolerate these faults. This process is repeated.
In theory, this process might never terminate, namely if F forever adds certain kinds
of faults to the new states. A finite fault model guarantees that this process must even-
tually terminate. In this paper, we assume our fault model to be finite and extension
monotonic.
Now we are able to define a fault-tolerant version. It captures the idea of starting
with some program Σ1 which is fault-intolerant regarding a specification SPEC and
some fault model F . A fault-tolerant version Σ2 of Σ1 is a program which has the
same behavior as Σ1 if no faults occur, but additionally satisfies SPEC in the presence
of faults.
Definition 7 (fault-tolerant version) Let F be a fault model, SPEC be a specification
and Σ1 and Σ2 be programs. Assume that Σ1 satisfies SPEC but F (Σ1) violates SPEC.
We call a program Σ2 the F -tolerant version of program Σ1 for SPEC using state
projection pi iff the following conditions hold:
1. Σ2 extends Σ1 using pi,
2. F (Σ2) satisfies SPEC.
3 Problem Statement
The basic task we would like to solve is to construct a fault-tolerant version for a given
program and a safety specification.
Definition 8 (general fail-safe transformation problem) Given a fault model F and
a program Σ1 which is F -intolerant with respect to a general safety specification
SPEC1. The general fail-safe transformation problem consists of finding a fault-tolerant
version of Σ1, i.e., a program Σ2 such that Σ2 extends Σ1 and F (Σ2) satisfies SPEC1.
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The case where SPEC is fusion closed has been studied by Kulkarni and Arora
[12] and Jhumka et al. [11], i.e., they solve a restricted transformation problem.
Definition 9 (fusion-closed fail-safe transformation problem) The fusion-closed fail-
safe transformation problem consists of solving the general fail-safe transformation
problem where SPEC1 is fusion closed.
In the remainder of this section we briefly recall the approaches used by Kulkarni
and Arora [12] and Jhumka et al. [11] to solve the latter problem.
3.1 Adding Fail-Safe Fault Tolerance to Fusion-Closed Specifications
The basic mechanism which Kulkarni and Arora [12] and Jhumka et al. [11] apply
is the creation of non-reachable states. The fact that specifications are fusion closed
implies that safety specifications can be concisely represented by a set of “bad” tran-
sitions, transitions which causes a violation of the specification [3, 10].
Definition 10 (maintains) Let Σ be a program, SPEC be a specification and α be a
finite computation of Σ. We say that α maintains SPEC iff there exists a sequence of
states β such that α · β ∈ SPEC.
If SPEC is a safety property, every trace not in SPEC has a prefix which does
not maintain SPEC . From the definition of maintains, we have that there must be a
transition where a given trace σ switches from “good” to “bad”, i.e., σ can be written
as α · d · b · β such that α · d maintains SPEC and all “longer” prefixes (starting with
α · d · b) do not maintain SPEC . Arora and Kulkarni have shown [4, “Only-if” part of
Lemma 3.2] that (d, b) is a transition which will cause any trace in which it occurs to
violate SPEC . We rephrase this result as follows:
Lemma 1 Let Σ = (C, I, T ) be a system, SPEC be safety property which is fusion
closed and assume that Σ violates SPEC and that for all x ∈ I holds that x maintains
SPEC. Then there exists a transition (d, b) ∈ T such that for all traces σ of Σ holds:
if (d, b) occurs in σ then σ 6∈ SPEC.
The known automated procedures [11, 12] which are based on the concept of non-
reachable states use the following approach for addition of fail-safe fault tolerance:
Since F (Σ1) violates SPEC , there must exist executions in which a specified bad
transition occurs. Inevitably, we must prevent the occurrence of such a transition. So,
for all bad transitions t = (d, b) we must make either state d or state b unreachable in
F (Σ2). If t is a program transition then it depends on whether or not t is reachable in
Σ1 or not.
• If t is a reachable program transition, then a violation of SPEC can occur even
if no faults occur, so, obviously, no fault-tolerant version exists since we would
have to change the behavior of the original program.
• If t is a redundant (i.e., non-reachable) program transition, then we can remove
it resulting in a smaller transition set T2 of Σ2.
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If t is a transition which has been introduced by F , then we cannot remove it directly.
The best we can do is make the starting state d of t unreachable. But this can only
be done if there exists a non-reachable program transition on the path to d. If such a
transition exists, we can safely remove it. If not, then again no fault-tolerant version
exists.
a b e fc d g h
Figure 2: Illustration for the Kulkarni-Arora method. The specification is “never h”.
As an illustration of the method consider Figure 2 which shows a program Σ1
in a state-chart like notation. Again, states are drawn as circles and transitions are
arrows between states. Initial states are identified using arrows without starting states.
Transitions which are introduced by F are shown as dashed arrows.
Assume the correctness specification SPEC for Σ1 is that it never reaches state h.
Obviously, the system satisfies SPEC in the absence of faults but it violates SPEC in
the presence of faults. The bad transitions which we must prevent in F (Σ2) are all
transitions which have state h as destination state. We can remove the transition (g, h)
easily from T2 because its removal does not change the fault-free behavior of Σ2. But
we cannot remove transition (f, h) since it is a fault transition. But luckily, there exists
a redundant transition (d, e) on the path leading to f which can be removed in T2. So
Σ2 is constructed from Σ1 by removing (g, h) and (d, e) from T2.
Figure 2 also helps to illustrate the cases where no fault-tolerant version exists. For
example, if there were a transition (c, h) ∈ T1 then h is reachable in Σ1 and, hence, Σ1
does not satisfy the specification anyway. The other case arises for example, if there
were a fault transition (b, h) ∈ F (T1), i.e., h is reachable along a path with only fault
transitions and reachable program transitions. Again, such an F is not tolerable. How-
ever, the fact that F is not tolerable is not a drawback of the transformation method; it
is simply states that generally the chosen fault assumption is too severe to be tolerated.
This concludes the recapitulation of the known approaches to automatically make
a program fail-safe fault tolerant. Recall that specifications are required to be fusion
closed. The above illustrations show that fusion closure together with the assumption
that a fault assumption is tolerable implies that state space redundancy (e.g., states d
and g) is already available in the fault-intolerant system Σ1. This type of redundancy
allows to formulate detection predicates in the language of guarded commands [6,
7] which is the basis of the Arora-Kulkarni theory [3]. These detection predicates
are conjoined to the guards of certain actions and hence have the effect of removing
transitions.
3.2 Handling Specifications which are Not Fusion Closed
Programs are presented in a guarded command notation [6, 7]. The state space of a
program is defined by a set of variables and the state transitions by a set of actions. An
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process Σ1
var x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} init 0
begin
x = 0 −→ x := 1
[] x = 1 −→ x := 2
[] x = 2 −→ x := 3
[] x = 3 −→ x := 4
[] f : x = 1 −→ x := 3
end
process Σ2
var x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} init 0
h sequence of {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} init 〈〉
begin
x = 0 −→ x := 1; h := 〈1〉
[] x = 1 −→ x := 2; h := 〈1, 2〉
[] x = 2 −→ x := 3; h := 〈1, 2, 3〉
[] x = 3 −→ x := 4; h := 〈1, 2, 3, 4〉
[] f : x = 1 −→ x := 3
end
Figure 3: Two programs in guarded command notation.
action of a program has the form
〈guard〉 → 〈statement〉
in which the guard is a boolean expression over the program variables and the state-
ment is either the empty statement or an instantaneous assignment to one or more vari-
ables. An execution is constructed by repeatedly and non-deterministically choosing
any action where the guard evaluates to true and executing the corresponding action.
Consider the program on the left side of Figure 3. The program has a variable
x which can take five different values (0–4) and simply proceeds from state x = 0 to
x = 4 through all intermediate states. The fault assumption F has added one transition
from x = 1 to x = 3 to the transition relation (the action is marked with an ‘f ’).
Consider the correctness specification
SPEC = “always (x = 4 implies that previously x = 2)”
Note that F (Σ1) does not satisfy SPEC (i.e., F (Σ1) can reach state x = 4 without
having been in state x = 2), and that SPEC is not fusion closed. To see the latter,
consider the two traces 0, 3, 2, 4 and 2, 3, 4 from SPEC . The fusion at state x = 3
yields trace 0, 3, 4 which is not in SPEC . Since SPEC is not fusion closed, we cannot
apply the known transformation methods [11, 12].
The specification can be made fusion closed by adding a history variable h which
records the entire state history. Such a variable has been added to the program on the
right side of Figure 3. Now SPEC can be rephrased as
SPEC = “always (x = 4 implies 〈2〉 ∈ h)”
or equivalently
SPEC = “never (x = 4 and 〈2〉 6∈ h)”
Now we can identify a set of bad transitions which must be prevented, e.g.:
x = 3 ∧ h = 〈1〉 → x = 4 ∧ h = 〈1, 2, 3, 4〉
The precondition for the transition to a state where x = 4 must be strengthened by the
detection predicate h 6= 〈1〉, i.e., the fourth guarded command of Σ2 must be changed
to:
x = 3 ∧ h 6= 〈1〉 −→ x := 4; h := 〈1, 2, 3, 4〉
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Hence, bad transitions are prevented and the modified system satisfies SPEC in the
presence fault f .
3.3 State Space Redundancy Through History Variables
Adding a history variable h in the previous example adds states to the state space of the
system. In fact, defining the domain of h as the set of all sequences over {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
adds infinitely many states. Clearly this can be reduced by the observation that if faults
do not corrupt h, then h will only take on five different values (〈〉, 〈1〉, 〈1, 2〉, 〈1, 2, 3〉,
and 〈1, 2, 3, 4〉). But still, the state space has been increased from five states to 52 = 25
states.
Note that Σ2 has redundant states and Σ1 is not redundant at all. So the redundancy
is due to the history variable h. But even if the domain of h has cardinality 5, the
redundancy is in a certain sense not minimal, as we now explain.
Consider the program Σ3 on the left side of Figure 4. It tolerates the fault f by
adding only one state to the state space of Σ1 (namely, x = 5). The state space together
with the transitions is depicted on the right side of the figure. Note that Σ3 has only one
redundant state, so Σ3 can be regarded as redundancy-minimal with respect to SPEC .
The metric used for minimality is the number of redundant states. We want to exploit
this observation to deal with the general case.
process Σ3
var x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} init 0
begin
x = 0 −→ x := 1
[] x = 1 −→ x := 2
[] x = 2 −→ x := 5
[] x = 5 −→ x := 4
[] f : x = 1 −→ x := 3
end
1 2 3 40
5
Figure 4: A redundancy-minimal version of the program in Figure 3 in guarded com-
mands (left) and a state chart notation (right). The specification is “always (x = 4
implies that previously x = 2)”.
4 Beyond Fusion Closure
Although the automated procedures of [11, 12] were developed for fusion-closed spec-
ifications, they (may) still work for specifications which are not fusion closed only if
the fault model has a certain pleasant form. For example, consider the system in Fig-
ure 5 and the specification
SPEC = “(e implies previously c) and (never g)”
Obviously, the fault model F can be tolerated using the known transformation methods
because F does not “exploit” the part of the specification which is not fusion closed.
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a b c d e f g
Figure 5: The fail-safe transformation can be successful even if the specification is not
fusion closed. The specification in this case is “(e implies previously c) and (never g)”.
4.1 Exploiting Non-Fusion Closure
Now we formalize what it means for a fault model to “exploit” the fact that a specifi-
cation is not fusion-closed (we call this property non-fusion closure). First we define
what it means for a trace to be the fusion of two other traces.
Definition 11 (fusion and fusion point of traces) Let s be a state and α = αpre · s ·
αpost and β = βpre · s · βpost be two traces in which s occurs. Then we define
fusion(α, s, β) = αpre · s · βpost
If fusion(α, s, β) 6= α and fusion(α, s, β) 6= β we call s a fusion point of α and β.
Lemma 2 For the fusion of three traces α, β, γ holds: If s occurs before s′ in β then
fusion(α, s, fusion(β, s′, γ)) = fusion(fusion(α, s, β), s′, γ)
and
fusion(γ, s′, fusion(α, s, β)) = fusion(γ, s′, β)
Proofs are written in a structured style similar to proof trees of interactive theorem
proving environments. This approach is advocated by Lamport who promises that this
style “makes it much harder to prove things that are not true” [14]. The proof is a
sequence of numbered steps at different levels. Every step has a proof which may be
refined at lower levels by additional steps. For example, step 〈1〉2. is the second step
on level 1. Proofs may also be read in a structured way, for example, by reading only
the top level steps and going into sublevels only when necessary.
PROOF: Assume that s occurs before s′ in β. The proof is by direct calculation. Let
α = αpre · s · αpost, β = βpre · s · βmid · s′ · βpost, and γ = γpre · s′ · γpost. Then
fusion(α, s, fusion(β, s′, γ)) = fusion(α, s, βpre · s · βmid · s′γpost)
= αpre · s · βmid · s′ · γpost
= fusion(αpre · ·s · βmid · s′ · βpost, s′, γpost)
= fusion(fusion(α, s, β), s′, γ)
proves the first equation and
fusion(γ, s′, fusion(α, s, β)) = fusion(γ, s′, αpre · s · βmid · s′ · βpost)
= γpre · s′ · βpost
= fusion(γ, s′, β)
proves the second equation.
If SPEC is a set of traces, we recursively define the fusion closure of SPEC , de-
noted by fusion-closure(SPEC), as the set which is closed under finite applications of
the fusion operator.
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Definition 12 (fusion closure) Given a specification SPEC, a trace σ is in fusion-closure(SPEC)
iff
1. σ is in SPEC, or
2. σ = fusion(α, s, β) for traces α, β ∈ fusion-closure(SPEC) and a state s that
occurs in α and β.
Lemma 2 guarantees that every trace in fusion-closure(SPEC) which is not in
SPEC has a “normal form”, i.e., it can be represented uniquely as the sequence of
fusions of traces in SPEC . This is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For every trace σ ∈ fusion-closure(SPEC) which is not in SPEC there
exists a sequence of traces α0, α1, α2, . . . and a sequence of states s1, s2, s3, . . . such
that
1. for all i ≥ 0, αi ∈ SPEC,
2. for all i ≥ 1, si is a fusion point of αi−1 and αi, and
3. σ can be written as:
σ = fusion(fusion(. . . fusion(α0, s1, α1), s2, α2), s3, α3), . . .)
PROOF SKETCH: The proof is by induction on the structure of how σ evolved from
traces in SPEC . Basically this means an induction on the number of fusion points
in sigma. The induction step assumes that σ is the fusion of two traces which have
at most n fusion points and depending on their relative positions uses the rules of
Lemma 2 to construct the normal form for sigma.
1 〈1〉1. The theorem holds for all traces which have one fusion point.
PROOF: Since σ has one fusion point, it can be written as σ = fusion(α0, s1, α1)
with α0 and α1 from SPEC and s1 a fusion point of α0 and α1.
2 〈1〉2. ASSUME: The theorem holds for all traces with at most n fusion points.
PROVE: The theorem holds for all traces σ which are fusions of traces with at
most n fusion points.
PROOF SKETCH: Take two traces τ and τ ′ which have at most n fusion points and
which share an additional common fusion point s (see Fig. 6). The new fusion point
s divides the fusion points in τ and τ ′ into two groups of k and m fusion points in
τ (and k′ and m′ fusion points in τ ′ respectively). The fusion of both traces will
maintain the k fusion points of τ and the m′ fusion points of τ ′. This follows from
the second equation of Lemma 2. Because of the ordering of the fusion points we
can use the first equation of Lemma 2 to construct the normal form. In general, the
resulting trace can have more than n fusion points.
2.1 〈2〉1. σ can be written as σ = fusion(τ, s, τ ′) where τ and τ ′ have at most n fusion
points.
PROOF: Follows from the fact that σ is the fusion of two traces with at most n
fusion points.
2.2 〈2〉2. σ can be written as
σ = fusion(fusion(. . . fusion(α0, s1, α1), s2, α2) . . .), s,
fusion(. . . fusion(α′0, s′1, α′1), s′2, α′2) . . .))
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PROOF: Follows from the induction hypothesis and by replacing τ and τ ′ with
their normal forms in the formula of step 〈2〉1.
2.3 〈2〉3. Let k, m, k′ and m′ denote the number of fusion points to the left and right of
s in τ and τ ′ (see Fig. 6). Then σ can be written as
fusion(. . . fusion(α0, s1, α1), s2, α2) . . .), s,
fusion(. . . fusion(α′k′ , s′k′+1, α′k′+1), s′k′+2, α′k′+2) . . .))
PROOF: The first k′ fusion points of τ ′ precede s and so by repeatedly applying
the second equation of Lemma 2 we can remove the k′ first applications of fusions
from the formula of step 〈2〉2.
2.4 〈2〉4. σ can be written as
fusion(. . . fusion(α0, s1, α1), s2, α2) . . .),
sk, αk), s, α′k′), s
′
k′+1, α
′
k′+1), s
′
k′+2, α
′
k′+2) . . .)
PROOF: From the definition of fusion, we can ignore the final m fusion points of
τ . The formula follows by repeatedly applying the first equation of Lemma 2 to
the formula of step 〈2〉3 (shifting the fusion operator to the left).
2.5 〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
PROOF: The formula of step 〈2〉4 has the required normal form because all αi
and α′j are in SPEC and all si and s′j are fusion points of consecutive elements in
the formula.
3 〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Follows from induction.
τ
τ ′
σ
k m
k′ m′
s
s
Figure 6: Diagram accompanying the proof of Theorem 1.
Now consider the system depicted in Figure 7. The corresponding specification is:
SPEC = “f implies previously d”
The system may exhibit the following two traces in the absence of faults, namely
α = a · b · c and β = a · d · e · f . In the presence of faults, a new trace is possible,
namely γ = a · b · e · f . Observe that γ violates SPEC and that γ is the fusion of two
traces α, β ∈ SPEC (the state which plays the role of s in Definition 11 is state e). In
such a case we say that fault model F exploits the non-fusion closure of SPEC .
We now formally define what is meant by exploiting the non-fusion closure of a
specification.
Definition 13 (exploiting non-fusion closure) Let Σ be a system, F be a fault model
and SPEC be a specification which is satisfied by Σ. Then F (Σ) exploits the non-
fusion closure of SPEC iff there exists a trace σ ∈ F (Σ) such that σ 6∈ SPEC and
σ ∈ fusion-closure(SPEC).
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b c d e fa
Figure 7: Example where the non-fusion closure of a specification is exploited by a
fault model. The specification is “f implies previously d”.
Intuitively, exploiting the non-fusion closure means that there exists a bad com-
putation (σ 6∈ SPEC ) that can potentially “impersonate” a good computation (σ ∈
fusion-closure(SPEC)). Definition 13 states that F causes a violation of SPEC by
constructing a fusion of two (allowed) traces.
Given a fault model F such that F (Σ) exploits the non-fusion closure of SPEC ,
then also we say that the non-fusion closure of SPEC is exploited for Σ in the presence
of F .
Obviously, if for some specification SPEC and system Σ such an F exists, then
SPEC is not fusion closed. Similarly trivial to prove is the observation that no fault
model F can exploit the non-fusion closure of a specification which is fusion closed.
On the other hand, if the non-fusion closure of SPEC cannot be exploited, this does
not necessarily mean that SPEC is fusion closed. To see this consider Figure 8. The
correctness specification SPEC of the program is “c implies previously a”. Obviously,
a fault model can only generate traces that begin with a. Since a is an initial state
and we assume initial state preservance, no F can exploit the non-fusion closure. But
SPEC is not fusion closed.
b ca
Figure 8: Example where the non-fusion closure cannot be exploited but the specifica-
tion is not fusion closed. The specification is “c implies previously a”.
4.2 Preventing the Exploitation of Non-Fusion Closure
The fact that a fault model may not exploit the non-fusion closure of a specification
will be important in our approach to solve the general fail-safe transformation problem
(Def. 8). A method to solve this problem, i.e., that of finding a fault-tolerant version
Σ2, should be a generally applicable method, which constructs Σ2 from Σ1 (this is de-
picted in the top part of Figure 9). Instead of devising such a method from scratch, our
aim is to reuse the existing transformations to add fail-safe fault tolerance which are
based on fusion-closed specifications [11, 12]. This approach is shown in the bottom
part of Figure 9. Starting from Σ1, we construct some intermediate program Σ′2 and
some intermediate fusion-closed specification SPEC2 to which we apply one of the
above mentioned methods for fusion-closed specifications [11, 12]. The construction
of Σ′2 and SPEC2 must be done in such a way that the resulting program satisfies the
properties of the general transformation problem stated in Definition 8. How can this
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be done?
The idea of our approach is the following: First, choose SPEC2 to be the fusion
closure of SPEC1, i.e., choose
SPEC2 = fusion-closure(SPEC1)
and construct Σ′2 from Σ1 in such a way that F (Σ′2) does not exploit the non-fusion
closure of SPEC1. More precisely, Σ′2 results from applying a constructive method
(which we give below) which ensures that
• Σ′2 extends Σ1 using some state projection pi and
• F (Σ′2) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC1.
Our claim, which we formally prove later, is that the program Σ2 resulting from ap-
plying (for example) the algorithms of [11, 12] to Σ′2 with respect to SPEC2 in fact
satisfies the requirements of Definition 8, i.e., Σ2 is in fact an F -tolerant version of Σ1
with respect to SPEC1.
fault-intolerant w.r.t.
general specification
SPEC1
fusion-closed
SPEC2
general method
“standard” fail-safe transformation
w.r.t. fusion-closed SPEC2
this paper
Σ′2
fault-tolerant w.r.t.
SPEC1
Σ1
Σ1 Σ2
Σ2
Figure 9: Overview of transformation problem (top) and our approach (bottom). The
constructive method described in Section 4.3 offers a solution to the first step (i.e.,
Σ1 → Σ′2).
4.3 Bad Fusion Points
For a given system Σ and a specification SPEC , how can we tell whether or not the
nature of SPEC is exploitable by a fault model? For the negative case (where it can
be exploited), we give a sufficient criterion. It is based on the notion of a bad fusion
point.
Definition 14 (bad fusion point) Let SPEC be a specification, Σ be a system satis-
fying SPEC, s be a state of Σ, and F a fault model such that F (Σ) violates SPEC.
State s is a bad fusion point of Σ for SPEC in the presence of F iff there exist traces
α, β ∈ SPEC such that
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1. s is a fusion point of α and β,
2. fusion(α, s, β) ∈ F (Σ), and
3. fusion(α, s, β) 6∈ SPEC.
Intuitively, a bad fusion point is a state in which “multiple pasts” may have hap-
pened, i.e., there may be two different execution paths passing through s, and from the
point of view of the specification it is important to tell the difference. We now give
several examples of bad fusion points.
As an example, consider Fig. 7 where e is a bad fusion point. To instantiate the
definition, take α = a · b · e ∈ F (Σ) and β = a · d · e · f ∈ F (Σ). The fusion at e
yields the trace a · b · e · f which is not in SPEC .
Theorem 2 (bad fusion point criterion) Let SPEC be a specification, Σ be a system
satisfying SPEC and F be a fault model. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. Σ has no bad fusion point for SPEC in the presence of F .
2. F (Σ) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC.
α0
α1
s1
s1
αk+1
sk+1
αk−1
αk
sk
σ
sk
sk+1β
σ′α
Figure 10: Diagram accompanying the proof of Theorem 2.
PROOF SKETCH: We prove the contraposition of the theorem in both directions. First
we assume that F (Σ) exploits the non-fusion closure and use Theorem 1 to construct
a bad fusion point. Second we prove that if there exists a bad fusion point then F (Σ)
exploits the non-fusion closure.
1 〈1〉1. ASSUME: Σ has no bad fusion point for SPEC in the presence of F .
PROVE: F (Σ) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC .
1.1 〈2〉1. ASSUME: F (Σ) exploits the non-fusion closure of SPEC .
PROVE: False
1.1.1 〈3〉1. There exists a minimal prefix σ′ of σ which violates SPEC .
PROOF: Follows from the fact that σ 6∈ SPEC and that SPEC is a safety prop-
erty.
1.1.2 〈3〉2. σ′ contains at least one fusion point.
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PROOF: Since σ 6∈ SPEC but σ ∈ fusion-closure(SPEC) we can apply Theo-
rem 1 and write σ as the fusion of traces αi ∈ SPEC (see Fig. 10. If there were
no fusion point within σ′, then σ′ would be a prefix of α0, a contradiction to
the fact that α0 ∈ SPEC .
1.1.3 〈3〉3. Let s denote the rightmost fusion point sk in σ′ and let α denote the prefix
of σ′ up to and including state s (see Fig. 10). Then α ∈ SPEC .
PROOF: Follows from the fact that σ′ is minimal (i.e., prefixes of σ′ satisfy
SPEC , shown in step 〈3〉1) and the fact that α is a prefix of σ′.
1.1.4 〈3〉4. If there exists a fusion point sk+1 after sk in αk, let β be the trace αk up
to and including sk (see Fig. 10). Otherwise let β be the trace αk. Then
β ∈ SPEC .
PROOF: In both cases β is a prefix of αk, which is in SPEC and so β ∈ SPEC
too.
1.1.5 〈3〉5. fusion(α, s, β) 6∈ SPEC
PROOF: Follows from the fact that σ′ is a prefix of fusion(α, s, β) and SPEC
is a safety property (any extension of σ′ is not in SPEC ).
1.1.6 〈3〉6. fusion(α, s, β) ∈ F (Σ)
PROOF: Follows from the construction of α and s (in step 〈3〉3) and β (in step
〈3〉4) and the fact that fusion(α, s, β) is a prefix of σ which is in F (Σ).
1.1.7 〈3〉7. s is a bad fusion point for Σ in the presence of F .
PROOF: Steps 〈3〉3 and 〈3〉4 exhibit traces α and β which are both in SPEC .
Step 〈3〉6 shows that their fusion at state s is in F (Σ). Finally, step 〈3〉5 shows
that this fusion is not in SPEC . From Definition 14 follows that s is a bad
fusion point for Σ in the presence of F .
1.1.8 〈3〉8. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Step 〈3〉7 contradicts the assumption that Σ has no bad fusion point in
the presence of F .
1.2 〈2〉2. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Follows indirectly from step 〈2〉1.
2 〈1〉2. ASSUME: F (Σ) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC .
PROVE: SPEC has no bad fusion point for Σ in the presence of F .
2.1 〈2〉1. ASSUME: SPEC has a bad fusion point for Σ in the presence of F .
PROVE: False
2.1.1 〈3〉1. There exists a trace σ in F (Σ) such that σ 6∈ SPEC and σ is the fusion of
two traces α and β in SPEC at some state s.
PROOF: From assumption.
2.1.2 〈3〉2. The non-fusion closure of SPEC can be exploited for Σ
PROOF: From step 〈3〉1 and the definition of exploits (Definition 13)
2.1.3 〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Step 〈3〉2 contradicts the assumption of the theorem.
2.2 〈2〉2. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Follows indirectly from step 〈2〉1.
3 〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
PROOF: The two top level steps show both directions of the equivalence.
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4.4 Removal of Bad Fusion Points
Theorem 2 states that it is both necessary and sufficient to remove all bad fusion points
from Σ to make its structure robust against fault models that exploit the non-fusion
closure of SPEC . So how can we get rid of bad fusion points?
Recall that a bad fusion point is one which has multiple pasts, and from the point
of view of the specification, it is necessary to distinguish between those pasts. Thus,
the basic idea of our method is to introduce additional states which split the fusion
paths. This is sketched in Figure 11. Let Σ1 = (C1, I1, T1) be a system. If s is a bad
fusion point of Σ1 for SPEC , there exists a trace β ∈ SPEC and a trace α ∈ F (Σ)
which both go through s.
Constructive Method to Remove Bad Fusion Points: To remove bad fusion points,
we now construct an extension Σ2 = (C2, I2, T2) of Σ1 in the following way:
• C2 = C1 ∪ {s′} where s′ is a “new” state,
• I2 = I1, and
• T2 results from T1 by “diverting” the transitions of β to and from s′ instead of s.
The extension is completed by defining the state projection function pi to map s′ to s.
Observe that s is not a bad fusion point regarding α and β anymore because α now
contains s and β a different state s′ which cannot be fused. So this procedure gets rid
of one bad fusion point. Also, it does not by itself introduce a new one, since s′ is an
extension state which cannot be referenced in SPEC . So we can repeatedly apply the
procedure and incrementally build a sequence of extensions Σ1,Σ2, . . . where in every
step one bad fusion point is removed and an additional state is added. However, F
may cause new bad fusion points to be created during this process by introducing new
faults transitions defined on the newly added states. But since the fault model is finite it
will do this only finitely often. Hence, repeating this construction for every bad fusion
point will terminate unless there are infinitely many bad fusion points. This, however,
is impossible if the state space is finite.
Note that in the extension process, certain states can be extended multiple times
because they might be bad fusion points for different combinations of traces.
s s
s′
α
β α
β
Figure 11: Splitting fusion paths.
We now prove that the above method results in a program with the desired proper-
ties.
Lemma 3 Let F be a fault model, SPEC1 be a non-fusion closed specification, and Σ1
be a program such that Σ1 satisfies SPEC1 but F (Σ1) violates SPEC1. The program
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Σ′2 which results from applying the constructive method described above satisfies the
following properties:
1. Σ′2 extends Σ1 using some state projection pi and
2. F (Σ′2) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC1.
PROOF SKETCH: To show the first point we argue that there exists a projection function
pi (which is induced by our method) such that every fault-free execution of Σ′2 is an
execution of Σ1. To show the second point, we argue that the method removes all bad
fusion points and apply the bad fusion point criterion proved as Theorem 2.
1 〈1〉1. The induced projection function pi of the constructive method above is such that
Σ′2 extends Σ1 using pi.
1.1 〈2〉1. For every state s of Σ1 exists a pi-image s′ in the state space of Σ′2.
PROOF: The constructive method starts off with the the state space of Σ′2 being
equal to the state space of Σ1 and any subsequent changes to pi do not affect this
initial mapping.
1.2 〈2〉2. Consider an arbitrary fault-free execution σ′ = s′1, s′2, . . . of Σ′2. Then pi(σ′)
is an execution of Σ1.
PROOF: Looking at Figure 11, every execution σ′ of Σ′2 evolves from an execution
of Σ1 by splitting fusion paths and adapting pi appropriately. Therefore, under the
projection function pi both executions look the same. Formally, this is proved
using an induction on the length of the execution.
1.3 〈2〉3. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Steps 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2 prove the two conditions of Definition 3 (extension)
with respect to the projection function pi. Hence, Σ′2 extends Σ1 using pi.
2 〈1〉2. F (Σ′2) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC1.
2.1 〈2〉1. Σ′2 has no bad fusion point in the presence of F .
PROOF: This is a result from applying the constructive method. Because all fusion
paths are split, no fusion points remain.
2.2 〈2〉2. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Because of step 〈2〉1 we can apply the bad fusion point criterion (Theo-
rem 2) which shows that the non-fusion-closure of SPEC cannot be exploited for
Σ′2 in the presence of F .
3 〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
PROOF: The above two steps show the two consequents of the lemma.
4.5 Correctness of the Combined Method
Starting from a program Σ1, Lemma 3 shows that the program Σ′2 resulting from
the constructive method for removing bad fusion points enjoys certain properties (see
Fig. 9). We now prove that starting off from these properties and choosing SPEC2
as the fusion closure of SPEC1, the program Σ2, which results from applying the
algorithms of [11, 12] on Σ′2, has the desired properties of the transformation problem
(Definition 8).
Lemma 4 GivenF , SPEC1, and Σ1 as in Lemma 3, let SPEC2 = fusion-closure(SPEC1)
and let Σ2 be the result of applying any of the known methods that solve the fusion-
closed transformation problem of Definition 9 to Σ′2 with respect to F and SPEC2,
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where Σ′2 results from Σ1 through the application of the constructive method. Then
the following statements hold:
1. Σ2 extends Σ1 using some state projection pi.
2. If F (Σ2) satisfies SPEC2 then F (Σ2) satisfies SPEC1.
PROOF SKETCH: To prove the first point we argue that a fault tolerance addition proce-
dure only removes non-reachable transitions. Hence, every fault-free execution of Σ′2
is also an execution of Σ2. But since Σ′2 extends Σ1 so must Σ2. To show the second
point we first observe that F (Σ′2) does not necessarily satisfy SPEC1 but not all traces
for this are in F (Σ2) anymore (due to the removal of bad transitions during addition
of fault tolerance). Next we show that any trace of F (Σ2) which violates SPEC1 must
exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC1. But this must also be a trace of F (Σ′) and
so is ruled out by assumption.
1 〈1〉1. If Σ′2 extends Σ1 using state projection pi′ then Σ2 extends Σ1 using state pro-
jection pi
1.1 〈2〉1. Application of the known methods to add fail-safe fault tolerance according
to Definition 9 does not change the fault-free behavior of that system.
PROOF: For the methods of Kulkarni and Arora [12] and Jhumka et al. [11] this
has been discussed in Section 3.
1.2 〈2〉2. Every (fault-free) execution of Σ′2 is also a (fault-free) execution of Σ2 and
vice versa.
PROOF: Follows from step 〈2〉1 and the fact that Σ2 results from Σ′2 by applying
the fail-safe-tolerance transformation (see Fig. 9).
1.3 〈2〉3. Every execution of Σ′2 under pi′ is an execution of Σ1.
PROOF: Follows from the assumption that Σ′2 extends Σ1 using pi′.
1.4 〈2〉4. Every execution of Σ2 is also an execution of Σ1 under pi′ and vice versa.
PROOF: Starting with an arbitrary execution σ of Σ2, step 〈2〉2 allows to find an
equivalent execution σ′ of Σ′2. Then for σ′, step 〈2〉3 allows to find an equivalent
execution σ′′ of Σ1.
1.5 〈2〉5. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Step 〈2〉4 allows to construct a state projection function such that the
safety properties of Σ1 and Σ2 are identical. Hence, Σ2 extends Σ1.
2 〈1〉2. ASSUME: 1. F (Σ′2) does not exploit the non-fusion closure of SPEC1.
2. F (Σ2) satisfies SPEC2.
PROVE: F (Σ2) satisfies SPEC1.
2.1 〈2〉1. All executions σ of F (Σ′2) that violate SPEC1 are not in F (Σ2).
PROOF: This follows from applying a fail-safe tolerance transformation proce-
dure, such as those in [11, 12]. Since these procedures are proved to be sound,
i.e., the resulting programs are indeed fail-safe fault-tolerant, then no execution
can violate the specification.
2.2 〈2〉2. ∀σ ∈ F (Σ2) : σ ∈ SPEC2
PROOF: Follows directly from second assumption, i.e., F (Σ2) satisfies SPEC2.
2.3 〈2〉3. ∀σ ∈ F (Σ2) : σ ∈ F (Σ′2)
PROOF: The known fail-safe tolerance transformation procedures that solve Def-
inition 9 guarantee that F (Σ2) ⊆ F (Σ′2), from which this step follows.
2.4 〈2〉4. F (Σ2) does not exploit non-fusion closure of SPEC1.
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PROOF: For a contradiction, assume that there is an execution τ ∈ F (Σ2) that
exploits non-fusion closure of SPEC1. Since τ ∈ F (Σ2), from step 〈2〉3 we have
that τ ∈ F (Σ′2). Hence, F (Σ′2) also exploits the non-fusion closure of SPEC1, a
contradiction to assumption 2.
2.5 〈2〉5. ∀σ ∈ F (Σ2) : σ ∈ SPEC1
2.5.1 〈3〉1. ASSUME: σ ∈ Σ2
PROVE: QED
PROOF: Since σ ∈ Σ2 and Σ2 extends Σ1 we have that σ ∈ Σ1. But since Σ1
satisfies SPEC1 we conclude that σ ∈ SPEC1.
2.5.2 〈3〉2. ASSUME: σ ∈ F (Σ2) \ Σ2
PROVE: QED
PROOF: First note that σ cannot be in fusion-closure(SPEC1)\SPEC1 (follows
from step 〈2〉4). But since fusion-closure(SPEC1) = SPEC2 and since F (Σ2)
satisfies SPEC2 we have that σ must be in SPEC1.
2.5.3 〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Follows from steps 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2 and the fact that they cover all
cases.
2.6 〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Step 〈2〉5 shows that F (Σ2) satisfies SPEC1 which is what we wanted
to prove.
3 〈1〉3. Q.E.D.
PROOF: Steps 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2 prove the first and second point of the lemma, respec-
tively.
Lemmas 3 and 4 together guarantee that the composition of the method described
in Section 4.3 and the fail-safe transformation methods for fusion-closed specifica-
tions in fact solves the transformation problem for non-fusion closed specifications of
Definition 8.
Theorem 3 Given a fault model F and a program Σ1 which is F -intolerant with re-
spect to a non-fusion closed specification SPEC1. The composition of the constructive
method described in Section 4.3 and the fail-safe transformation methods for fusion-
closed specifications solves the general transformation problem of Definition 8, i.e.,
constructs a program Σ2 such that Σ2 extends Σ1 and F (Σ2) satisfies SPEC1.
4.6 Examples
Finally, we present two examples of the application of our method. The top of Fig-
ure 12 (system 1) shows the original system. The augmented system is depicted at the
bottom (system 4). The correctness specification for the system is “(d implies previ-
ously b) and (e implies previously c)”. There are only two bad fusion points, namely c
and d which have to be extended. In the first step, c is “removed” by splitting the fusion
path which is indicated using two short lines. This results in system 2. Subsequently,
d is refined, resulting in system 3. Note that d has to be refined twice because there are
two sets of fusion paths. This results in system 4, which can be subject to the standard
fail-safe transformation methods, which will remove the transitions (c, d′′) and (d, e).
A similar, yet more complex example is shown in Figure 13. The correctness
specification for the system 1 at the top is “g implies previously (b or c)”. The figure
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(1) a b c d e
a b c d e
c′
a b c d e
c′ d′
a b c d e
d′′
d′c′
Figure 12: Removing bad fusion points. The specification is “(d implies previously b)
and (e implies previously c)”.
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shows that again a “two level” extension is necessary here, since the only execution
which must be prevented is the one which uses both fault transitions. This means that
state f is a bad fusion point for multiple execution paths and hence must be refined
twice (note that the fault transition (d, f) is a new fault added to the system in the
extension).
4.7 Discussion
The complexity of our method directly depends on the number of bad fusion points
which have to be removed. Bad fusion points are not hard to find if the specification
is given as a temporal logic formula in the spirit of those used throughout this paper.
For example, if specifications are given in the form “x only if previously y” then only
states which occur in traces between x and y can be fusion points. Candidates for bad
fusion points are all states where two execution paths merge.
Our method requires to check every one of these states whether it is a bad fusion
point. So obviously, applying our method induces a larger overhead than directly
adding history variables. But as can be seen in Figs. 12 and 13, the number of states is
significantly less than adding a general history variable. For example, a clever addition
of history variables to the system im Fig. 12 would require two bits, one to record the
visit to state b and one to record the visit to c. Overall this would result in 2×2×5 = 20
states. Our methods achieves the same result with a total of 8 states. The system in
Fig. 13 could employ a boolean history variable which records whether states b or e
have been visited (it is set to true as soon as one of these states is reached). Adding
such a variable would create a total of 7 additional states. Our methods just adds 5.
Note however that the resulting system in Fig. 12 is not redundancy minimal. The
state d′′ is not necessary since it may become unreachable even in the presence of
faults after the fail-safe transformation is applied. This is the price we still have to pay
for the modularity of our approach, i.e., adding history states does at present not “look
ahead” which states might become unreachable even in the presence of faults.
In theory there are cases where our method of adding history states does not termi-
nate because there are infinitely many bad fusion points. For this to happen, the state
space must be infinite. If we consider the application area of embedded software, we
can safely assume a bounded state space.
Given a program Σ and a general specification SPEC , then our combined method
will find a solution to the general transformation problem iff (a) there exists one with a
finite number of additional states and (b) the method of adding fail-safe fault-tolerance
for fusion-closed specifications is complete. Requirement (a) ensures that our method
of removing bad fusion points will terminate.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented ways on how get rid of a restriction upon which
procedures that add fault tolerance [11, 12] are based, namely that specifications have
to be fusion closed. Our method can be viewed as a finer grained method to add
history information to a given system and hence add state space redundancy. We have
shown that our method in general adds less history states than would be added using
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
a b ec d f g
a b ec d f g
c′
a b ec d f g
c′ d′
a b ec d f g
c′ d′ e′
c′ d′ e′ f ′
a b ec d f g
f ′′
a b ec d f g
c′ d′ e′ f ′
Figure 13: A more complex example. The specification is “g implies previously (b or
e)”.
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standard history variables (which in general lead to an exponential growth of the state
space). Thus, adding state redundancy using the approach presented in this paper
makes addition of fault tolerance more efficient.
As future work, it would be interesting to combine our method with one of the
methods to add detectors so that the resulting method is redundancy minimal. We
are also investigating issues of non-masking fault-tolerance, i.e, adding tolerance with
respect to liveness properties.
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